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Abstract
The creation of electricity markets has raised the fundamental question as to
whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the reserves needed
to maintain system reliability, or whether some form of regulation is needed. In some
states in the US, electricity retailers have been made responsible for providing such
reserves by contracting capacity in excess of their forecasted peak demand. The so-
called Installed Capacity Markets (ICAP) provide one means for contracting reserves,
and are the subject of this paper. In particular, for given productive and transmission
capacities, we identify ¯rms' opportunity costs of committing resources in the capac-
ity market, and hence, the costs of inducing full capacity commitment. Regulatory
issues such as the optimal choice of the reserve margin and the capacity de¯ciency rate
(which serves as a price-cap) are analyzed. From a welfare view-point, we also com-
pare the desirability of providing reserves either through capacity markets or through
the demand side (i.e. voluntary curtailments).
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1 Introduction
Unlike virtually any other commodity, electricity is extremely costly -if not impossible- to
store. Furthermore, electricity markets di®er from virtually all other markets in that they
require instantaneous and continuous balancing of its demand and supply resources. A
failure to equate demand and supply endangers the stability of the network and may result
in disruptions of consumption that not only a®ect the market participants that caused the
imbalance, but the system as a whole. The challenge imposed by the need to maintain
continuous electrical equilibrium is further exacerbated by the fact that almost all end-
consumers do not have the metering technology to observe nor the economic incentives
to respond to real-time prices. This implies that little or none of the supply/demand
balancing can be done through the demand side.1 The stability of the system at all
times thus requires the adequacy of capacity resources to meet the peak of demand plus a
reserve margin, capable of withstanding unanticipated loss of generation and transmission
capacity.2
Under the traditional regulatory schemes, the electric utilities were responsible for
providing adequate capacity of supply and for ensuring the security of the system through
the e±cient use of the available capacity resources. As these regulatory schemes have been
replaced by market-based mechanisms, both functions have been unbundled. Whereas
the System Operator has the responsibility of ensuring system security, the provision of
adequate capacity resources is relied on market forces alone, under the expectation that
prices would provide the right signals for the e±cient investments.
Recent experience and the poor performance of some of these restructured electricity
markets, have led several regulatory authorities to rely on alternative regulatory designs
to bring forth the incentives to provide adequate capacity resources (see Forsberg and
Fritz, 2001, Hobbs and Kahal 2001, Klein, 2001 for a detailed analysis of the di®erent
mechanisms that have been implemented in practice).
In broad terms, capacity payment systems can be classi¯ed as either price or quantity
based. The basic principle of price-based systems is that capacity availability is rewarded
either through lump-sum payments (as in Argentina and Spain) or via an uplift to energy
1See Borenstein and Holland (2003) for an analysis of Real Time Pricing and the potential e®ects it
could have on the performance of electricity markets.
2The blackout that took place in the US East coast in August 2003 shows that the value of the losses
caused by a system imbalance may be substantially large (See Joskow 2003b and The Economist 2003).Capacity Markets for Electricity 2
payments that depends on the probability of outages (as in the former UK pool). These
solutions have been highly criticized, because they create poor incentives to alleviate the
capacity problem and may even worsen it. For instance,3 generators may try to increase
capacity payments by making fewer capacity resources available thereby increasing, rather
than decreasing, the probability of shortage.
Quantity-based systems are the focus of the policy debate in the US. To date, two
quantity-based methods have been adopted: operating reserve markets, and installed or
available capacity markets. The main purpose underlying the introduction of the latter has
been to ensure that adequate capacity is committed on a daily or seasonal basis to meet
system load and reserve requirements. The Load Serving Entities (LSEs), e.g. distributors
that sell electricity to end-user consumers, must satisfy their capacity obligations, which
equal their expected peak monthly loads plus a reserve margin. They can accomplish
this, either by internal or bilateral transactions, or through the capacity market in which
generators sell a recall right that empowers the System Operator to recall them in the
event of shortages. The equilibrium price in the capacity market should be re°ective of
the overall capacity in the system in relation to LSEs' obligations.
Capacity markets of this kind have been introduced in several systems, such as New
England or New York; the Californian Independent System Operator is currently consid-
ering the possibility of creating an available capacity market (CA-ISO, 2002). However,
there is an ongoing-debate about the desirability of introducing capacity markets as a
means to achieve adequate system reliability. On the one hand, the critics of ICAP mar-
kets argue that they are an unnecessary relict of regulation (Hobbs, Inon, Stoft, 2001),
as markets provide the right incentives for agents to assure the desired reliability level.
On the other hand, the advocates of ICAP markets a±rm that they serve to mitigate the
free-riding of some customers to bene¯t from system reliability paid by others (Ja®e and
Felder, 1996).
This momentum has motivated our analysis. In particular, our paper provides the ¯rst
analytical model that analyzes the performance and design of electricity capacity markets.
Our work has two main objectives. The ¯rst one is to identify the link between the capac-
ity and energy markets when generators also have the option (subject to a transmission
constraint) to sell electricity in an adjacent, more pro¯table market. With this purpose,
we characterize the generators' optimal strategies - which involve the three-fold decision
3See Newbery, 1992, Wolak and Patrick, 1997.Capacity Markets for Electricity 3
of how many resources to commit in the capacity market, and how much energy to o®er in
the national and foreign energy markets - and investigate how these decisions are a®ected
by the degree of competition. Our second main objective is to analyze the design of capac-
ity markets and determine, within our stylized set-up, the optimal capacity requirement
and capacity de¯ciency rate that should be imposed in these markets. Related to this,
we also analyze the desirability of increasing the energy price-cap in order to avoid the
migration of capacity resources to the adjacent market. Throughout the paper, we will
focus on short-term issues, i.e. reliability problems, and leave the question of whether
capacity markets o®er adequate incentives for investments in new generation capacity for
further research.4
Our model has been inspired by the design of the Installed Capacity Market in Pennsylvania-
New Jersey- Maryland (PJM),5 whose main features are described in Section 2. The re-
maining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the model. Sections
4 and 5 characterize the ¯rms' problem under the extreme cases of monopoly and perfect
competition, and Section 6 provides the solution to the regulator's problem. Section 7
concludes, and most proofs are relegated to the Appendix, which also extends the analysis
to the case of tradable transmission rights.
2 The Pennsylvania- New Jersey- Maryland System
Pennsylvania- New Jersey- Maryland was initially established in 1927 as a centrally dis-
patched control area pooling the generation and transmission facilities of several utilities.
Today, PJM is the largest centrally dispatched electric power system in North America.
PJM initiated a voluntary bid-based energy market (including day-ahead and hour ahead
markets) on April 1, 1997, coincident with the implementation of its Open Access Trans-
mission Tari®. PJM Interconnection became the ¯rst operational Independent System
Operator (ISO) in the United States on January 1, 1998. Its objectives are to ensure the
reliability of the transmission network and to facilitate a competitive wholesale market.
The PJM System Operator has implemented a system of locational marginal prices, cal-
culating prices for over 2.000 nodes every ¯ve minutes and providing real-time price of
4See Hirst and Hadley (1999), and Stoft (2000) for a discussion of this topic.
5Although the design of capacity markets di®ers from system to system, it should be noted that most
of our analysis should be helpful in also clarifying the performance of the capacity markets implemented
elsewhere.Capacity Markets for Electricity 4
transmission. PJM also operates the regulation market, providing ancillary services, and
the ¯xed transmission right monthly auction market.
2.1 The Capacity Credit Market
From the inception of the pool, the PJM has relied upon capacity obligations to ensure
reliability. Prior to the restructuring, Load Serving Entities (LSEs), e.g. distributors to
¯nal customers, had capacity obligations on an annual basis. Capacity resources consist in
MW of generation capacity (net of planned outages) which are committed to serve speci¯c
PJM loads. Capacity obligations have played a critical role in maintaining reliability
and contributing to realize a competitive energy market. In fact, following the Reliability
Assurance Agreement (RAA), capacity obligation ensures that adequate capacity resources
will be planned and made available to help solving emergencies. On April 1, 2002, the
PJM-West Region joined PJM and on this occasion, a new reliability assurance agreement
was developed (PJM, 2003).
After the liberalization of the energy sector, capacity obligations are met through
market mechanisms. On October 1, 1998, PJM initiated monthly and multi-monthly
capacity markets; daily capacity markets were introduced in 1999. Bilateral transactions
on capacity are also allowed. Collectively, these arrangements are known as the Installed
Capacity (ICAP) market.
The supply in the capacity market is provided by generators in the PJM control area
that meet speci¯c technical and security criteria. A very interesting feature is that capacity
resources can be de-listed, or exported, from the PJM control area and vice-versa, imported
from neighboring systems. In fact generators sell a recall right to the energy produced
by their units and sold to entities outside PJM. This right enables PJM to recall energy
exports from capacity resources when needed. When capacity resources are recalled, the
supplier is paid the prevailing PJM energy market price.
The demand in the capacity market is ¯xed, as indirectly determined by the System
Operator through the choice of LSEs' capacity obligations, following complex rules set
forth in the RAA.6 The current rules require LSEs to own or purchase capacity resources
greater than or equal to their expected peak-load plus a reserve margin, which is set on the
basis of an annual reliability analysis performed by PJM and the standards established by
6The PJM forecasted capacity requirements (net of planned outages) were 56.623 MW in January 2002
and 57.328 MW in June 2002 (Klein, 2001).Capacity Markets for Electricity 5
the North American and the Mid-Atlantic Electric Reliability Councils. More precisely,
the overall capacity obligation associated with load in the PJM-East region is de¯ned for
an annual period,7 while the capacity obligation associated with load in the PJM-West
region is de¯ned daily.
An LSE can satisfy its obligation by reliance on self-supply, acquisition in bilateral
markets, or acquisition of capacity credits from the daily, monthly and multi-monthly
Capacity Credit Markets. All generation capacities contributing to the pool installed
reserve are paid the market clearing price of capacity. Participation in any PJM capacity
market is voluntary, the mandatory aspects being expired on May 31, 2001.
If an LSE is short of capacity and does not submit a buy bid in the capacity market,
a mandatory bid covering its obligation will be submitted. This mandatory bid is equal
to the Capacity De¯ciency Rate (CDR), which is currently equal to $174.73 per MW-
day (PJM, 2003).8 This charge is intended to cover temporary imbalances and thus it is
expected to apply to only a small fraction of total load, as \the intent of ICAP charge
was to discourage participants from leaning on the capacity of the others" (FERC, 2001).
Therefore, if an LSE is short of capacity, it pays a penalty that will equal the daily amount
of capacity de¯ciency times the number of days in the season. More drastically, if an LSE
does not comply its obligation when the system itself is short of capacity, the de¯ciency
charge is the double of the CDR. It must be noted that, as FERC (2001) points out,
\the level of the penalty charge e®ectively caps the capacity price, since customers will
not pay more for capacity than the penalty charge". Conversely, if an LSE complies with
its capacity obligation, it is also entitled to earn a revenue accrued from the de¯ciency
charges (if any).9
7See FERC Docket EL01-63-003 amending the RAA -paragraph 7.4b, in response to a PJM ¯ling. FERC
a±rms that committing capacity on a seasonal rather than a daily basis insulates capacity obligations from
the volatility of energy spot prices and gives the LSEs the incentive to arrange for a long-term and assured
supply of capacity.
8The Capacity De¯ciency Rate is designed to re°ect the annual ¯xed cost of a combustion turbine in
PJM and the associated transmission investment, including a return on investment, depreciation and ¯xed
operation and maintenance expenses. It is also adjusted for the forced outage rate and thus may change
annually.
9See FERC, Docket No. ER01-1440-000, in force as from June 2001, amending the Schedule 11 D of the
RAA. Previous to this amendment, only LSE and generators owners having excess capacity were entitled
to share de¯ciency revenues in proportion to their excess capacity.Capacity Markets for Electricity 6
2.2 The Performance of the Capacity Credit Market
Transactions in the capacity credit market have mainly been concluded by entrants, and
the volume of trade has been increasing steadily. The PJM Market Monitoring Unit
(henceforth, MMU) reports that the functioning of these markets has been competitive in
1999 and 2002 (see PJM 2000 and 2003). Some price spikes have been observed in 2000
and,10 for the ¯rst time since the introduction of the capacity markets in December 1998,
the pool was de¯cient for some days in June, July and August 2000 - owners of capacity
increased their exports for periods during which external prices exceeded the PJM price
and therefore de-listed their resources from the PJM. In particular, on June 1, the total
demand for daily capacity credits exceeded the sum of capacity net of planned outages and
the pool was de¯cient by 334 MW. On June 2, the daily price was $174/MW-day, and on
June 3, it rose to $177 (close to the binding CDR in 2000) and it remained at that level for
the rest of the month. After investigation, the MMU reported that the opportunity costs of
selling into the PJM market (de¯ned as \the additional revenue foregone from not selling
into an external energy and/or capacity market") appear to explain the level of supply
available to the daily capacity credit markets, de-listing and imports by capacity owners
and thus the shape of the supply function and the ultimate market price. The high levels
of mandatory bids, that is the capacity de¯ciency charge, contributed to the observed level
of market prices. After reviewing key measures of market structure and performance (net
revenue, price-cost mark-up index, concentration and prices), the MMU concluded that
the energy market in 2000 was \reasonably competitive", with no systematic exercise of
market power, although \the evidence is not dispositive" (PJM, 2001a). In particular,
the highest prices in the PJM real-time spot market occurred in December ($802/MWh),
while the next higher prices occurred during an early heat spell in May.
The only year that has raised serious concerns is 2001. Price spikes of about $177 were
observed on January 1 and 2, and for one day, January 3, the system was de¯cient and
the daily capacity price rose to $354. Prices then declined to $177 where they remained
until late March when prices began to decline further, reaching $0 in early April (PJM,
2001b). It is worth noting that PJM locational marginal prices have shown price spikes
10The volume-weighted average price for the entire year was $53.16/MW-day in the monthly and
multi-monthly capacity credit markets, and $69.39/MW-day in daily capacity credit markets; the vol-
ume weighted average of all the capacity credit markets for 2000 was $7.69 higher than in 1999, reaching
$60.55/MW-day (PJM, 2001a).Capacity Markets for Electricity 7
during a single period of hot weather in the week of August 6.
In a report to the Public Utilities Commission, the MMU clearly a±rms that the
price spikes observed during 2001 have been caused by a seller exercising an e®ective
monopoly position in the capacity market by taking advantage of the method used to
allocate de¯ciency revenues. During 2001, these revenues were allocated to holders of
uncommitted capacity resources (this rule has now been changed, see previous Section).
According to the MMU, this methodology has encouraged one holder of unsold capacity
to either withhold that capacity from the market or o®er it for sale at a price equal to
the CDR. This unilateral market power conduct, in turn, caused participants short of
capacity either to be de¯cient (and pay the CDR, which then would be distributed to the
withholder of the unsold capacity resources) or to purchase capacity at the CDR.
Delisted capacity in January reduced the net supply of capacity by a small amount
(37MW). The MMU has calculated that for the period from January through the beginning
of April, the price in the daily capacity market exceeded the additional value of selling
energy to the Cinergy hub or N.Y. West Zone A for the next day rather than selling
energy to the PJM West hub and capacity to the PJM capacity credit market. This shows
that the alternative value of energy was lower in the neighboring system than in PJM
capacity market, so that delisting became economically ine±cient. This further supports
the conclusion that market power during 2001 was due to the monopolistic behavior of
one capacity holder.
To conclude, the MMU asserts that \market power remains a serious concern given
the extreme inelasticity of demand and high levels of concentration in capacity credit
markets. Market power is structurally endemic to PJM capacity markets and any redesign
of capacity markets must address market power" (PJM, 2003).
3 The Model
Consider an electricity industry where total generation capacity is given by K: Marginal
costs of production are normalized to zero for production levels below capacity, whereas
production above capacity is impossible.
There are two energy markets: the national and the foreign market. Suppliers can
either sell or buy energy in either of them. For simplicity, the foreign energy market is
assumed to be perfectly competitive, and the prevailing foreign price is denoted f: InCapacity Markets for Electricity 8
the national energy market, suppliers compete to sell their production. Demand D is
determined each period as a random variable independent of the market price, i.e. it is
perfectly price inelastic. In particular, D 2 [0;1] is distributed according to some known
distribution function G(D), with density g (D): Prices in the national energy market are
capped at P:
Exports and imports between the national and foreign energy markets are limited by
the amount of total transmission capacity, ¯; which is assumed to be symmetrically divided
among suppliers through non-tradable transmission rights. Transmission losses are equal
to zero, so that transmission entails no costs.
Furthermore, there exists a capacity market where suppliers have the option to make
their capacity resources available if needed to cover the peaks of demand. When a supplier
commits some of his capacity resources, he entitles the regulator to `recall' them when
there is excess demand in the energy market.11 The supplier is not obliged to make
the committed resources available otherwise. The demand side in the capacity market
is composed of the Load Serving Entities, which are obliged to contract enough capacity
resources so as to cover a fraction of their expected demand plus a regulated reserve
margin. Hence, total demand in the capacity market- ¯xed and perfectly inelastic- is
indirectly determined by the capacity requirement chosen by the regulator. For simplicity,
we will just refer to it as total demand in the capacity market, and will denote it by £:
The inelasticity of demand implies that prices need to be capped at some level, C; which is
equivalent to the capacity de¯ciency rate imposed on those LSE who are capacity de¯cient.
Throughout the paper, we will make the following assumptions, in order to restrict the
set of parameter values to reasonable ones.
A1 : The portion of total capacity that cannot be exported (referred to as `non-exportable
capacity') is positive but not enough to satisfy peak demand in the national energy
market, i.e. 0 < K ¡ ¯ < 1:
A2 : If the transmission line were fully utilized to import energy from the foreign market,
this would be enough to satisfy peak demand in the national energy market, i.e.
K + ¯ ¸ 1:
A3 : The foreign energy price is higher than the national energy price-cap, i.e. f > P:
11If recalled, the generator also has the option to default on its commitment and pay a ¯ne. We assume
that such a ¯ne is large enough so that it does not pay the generator to default.Capacity Markets for Electricity 9
A4 : Every unit consumed reports a gross utility equal to v > f > P.
A5 : Demand in the capacity market does not exceed peak demand, i.e. £ · 1:
The ¯rst two assumptions set upper and lower bounds for aggregate productive ca-
pacity K; in relation to transmission capacity ¯. First, if the transmission line were fully
utilized to export energy abroad, the remaining productive capacity (referred to as non-
exportable capacity) would not be enough to satisfy the peak of demand. Otherwise, there
would be no need to have a capacity market.12 And second, if the transmission line were
fully used to import energy from abroad, there would be enough capacity to satisfy the
peak of demand. Otherwise, the regulator could not be sure that all demand would be
satis¯ed even if he o®ered to pay a very large capacity price for the committed resources.
The third assumption states that the foreign energy price is higher than the national
energy price-cap. Given our previous assumptions, having a capacity market would un-
necessary otherwise.13
The social valuation of energy consumed, that is the parameter v; is larger than the
price cap; this ensures a positive consumers' surplus which we consider when analyzing
regulatory issues. This parameter could also be interpreted as consumers' reservation
value, that is the costs of resorting to alternative energy sources, or equivalently, the
social loss of power curtailments, known as value of lost load.
Last, we have assumed that demand in the capacity market does not exceed peak
demand, given that there is no need (and it is costly) to demand capacity resources that
will never be recalled.14
The timing of the game proceeds as follows. Prior to the realization of demand in
the energy market, suppliers compete in the capacity market and receive their payments
for the amounts committed. Once demand in the energy market is realized and observed
by all suppliers, suppliers compete in the national and foreign energy markets. If there
12See for instance FERC (2001, p.3), \The Commission should impose a reserve capacity requirement
on electricity customers only if, without the requirement, the market would fail to elicit either su±cient
reserve capacity, or an appropriate mix of su±cient reserve capacity and voluntary curtailment, to meet
demand and avoid involuntary curtailments".
13We will also consider the case in which the regulator sets P = f in order to induce full capacity
commitment. This will imply that the capacity-market is not needed, but will also result in higher expected
energy prices. See the Regulator's problem in Section 6 for more on this.
14This comes from the fact that there are no random outages in the productive capacity.Capacity Markets for Electricity 10
is excess demand in the energy market, the regulator recalls the suppliers' committed
capacity resources, which are paid at the prevailing national energy market price. Last,
suppliers receive their payments for the energy sold.
We now proceed to characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game by back-
ward induction. First, we solve for the energy market competition game. Second, we move
to the capacity market competition game to characterize ¯rms' capacity commitments and
the equilibrium price, for given £ and C: Last, we analyze the regulator's problem, who
has to choose how many resources to demand in the capacity-market, £; and has to set the
capacity price-cap, C. Given these optimal choices, he has to decide whether to introduce
a capacity market or to resort to power curtailment as a source of reserves.
4 Monopoly
Consider ¯rst the monopoly case. Since the monopolist faces no competition, he is able to
extract all the rents by bidding at the price-cap in both the energy and capacity markets.
He has nevertheless to decide how much energy to o®er, and how many capacity resources
to commit. Given that the foreign energy market is more pro¯table, i.e. f > P; the
¯rst decision is trivial: the monopolist will fully utilize the transmission link, and he will
therefore only o®er to produce his non-exportable capacity, K ¡ ¯.
In the capacity market, the monopolist faces a trade-o® when deciding how many
capacity resources to commit: committing a large amount of capacity resources leads to
large capacity market payments, but this comes at the cost of reducing the monopolist's
energy market pro¯ts, given that in the event of recall, he will have to sell his energy at
the national energy price-cap, P; rather than at the foreign market price, f:
The monopolist solves this trade-o® by choosing the capacity commitment, µ; that
maximizes his total pro¯ts Cµ + ¼m (µ); i.e. the sum of capacity payments plus energy




[PD + f¯]dG(D) +
Z µ
K¡¯
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The ¯rst term in equation (1) represents the pro¯t that the monopolist earns when
demand does not exceed his non-exportable capacity: the monopolist satis¯es all internal
demand at a price P and fully exploits his transmission line to export energy at a price f:
The second element in equation (1) gives the pro¯ts made by the monopolist when demand
is larger than his non-exportable capacity but still lower than his capacity commitment.
In this case, the monopolist will sell his non-exportable capacity at P, and the di®erence
between his commitment and his production will be recalled and paid at the prevailing
price. Therefore, the monopolist will only be able to export what he can produce with
its remaining productive capacity, so that the transmission capacity will no longer be
binding. As represented by the third element of the equation, when demand exceeds the
monopolist's capacity commitment, the monopolist will sell up to his commitment in the
national market, and will export his remaining capacity. Last, note if the monopolist
cannot ful¯ll his commitment with his own productive capacity, i.e. µ > K; he has to
import the di®erence from abroad. The monopolist thus makes pro¯ts PK but looses the
price di®erential [f ¡ P] times the excess of his commitment over his productive capacity.15
Let us now asses the e®ect on the monopolist's pro¯ts of a marginal increase in his
capacity commitment. First, for values µ 2 [0;K ¡ ¯]; increases in µ have a positive
marginal e®ect on the monopolist's pro¯ts, given that increases in µ within this interval
have no e®ect on his energy market pro¯ts (the regulator cannot recall more than what
the monopolist is already producing) but lead to larger capacity market revenues. This
implies that the monopolist ¯nds it always pro¯table to commit at least his non-exportable
capacity resources.
For values µ 2 [K ¡ ¯;£], a marginal increase in µ increases the monopolist's ca-
pacity revenues by C but reduces his energy market pro¯ts by [f ¡ P][1 ¡ G(µ)]; where
[f ¡ P] gives the price di®erential that the monopolist gives up when he marginally in-
creases µ; and [1 ¡ G(µ)] gives the marginal increase in the probability of being recalled:
Therefore, the monopolist's marginal opportunity cost from committing µ is given by
C ¡ [f ¡ P][1 ¡ G(µ)]: Clearly, the marginal bene¯t C is independent of µ; whereas the
marginal cost [f ¡ P][1 ¡ G(µ)] decreases with µ: All this implies that the opportunity
cost of listing capacity increases with µ, or equivalently, that the monopolist's pro¯t func-
15Note that if there is excess transmission capacity and capacity de¯cit in the spot market, the system
operator could export energy from abroad and pay it a price f; we exclude this possibility and relax it in
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tion ¼m (µ)+Cµ is convex in µ for µ 2 [K ¡ ¯;£]: Accordingly, we have corner solutions,
with the monopolist either committing K ¡ ¯ or £ capacity resources, depending on the
value of C.
The following Lemma identi¯es the critical value of C that determines the monopolist's
optimal commitment:
Lemma 1 There exists Cm = Cm(£;K ¡ ¯;f ¡ P) such that the monopolist's optimal
decision is to o®er to commit at least £ capacity resources if and only if C ¸ Cm (market
clearing equilibrium) and to only o®er to commit its non-exportable capacity, K ¡ ¯;
otherwise (capacity-de¯cit equilibrium).
The critical value Cm represents the opportunity cost of committing £ rather than
(K ¡ ¯) resources, i.e. the loss in the energy market revenues relative to the gain in
capacity payments:
Cm =
¼m (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼m (£)
£ ¡ (K ¡ ¯)
Using the pro¯t expression (1) evaluated at K ¡ ¯ and £, gives
Cm = [f ¡ P]
·Z £
K¡¯
D ¡ (K ¡ ¯)
£ ¡ (K ¡ ¯)
dG(D) + [1 ¡ G(£)]
¸
(2)
The level of demand in the capacity market £ will a®ect the value of these opportunity
costs, through three e®ects. First, for a given demand realization below £; increases in
£ raise capacity market gains and leave energy market losses una®ected; hence, within
this range, the ratio of the losses over the gains goes down. Second, for a given demand
realization above £; increases in £ raise capacity market gains and energy market losses in
the same proportion, so that the ratio remains una®ected. And third, increases in £ shift
down (up) the probability given to demand realizations above (below) £. Since the ratio
of the losses over the gains is higher when demand lies above £ than when it lies below £
the opportunity cost of committing £ rather than (K ¡ ¯) goes down as £ increases.
Changes in the value non-exportable capacity (K ¡ ¯) only in°uence the ratio of the
gains over the losses for demand values below £: Over this range, increases in (K ¡ ¯)
reduce more the gains in terms of capacity payments than the energy market losses. Hence
Cm decreases with the value of non-exportable capacity.Capacity Markets for Electricity 13
Last, when a supplier chooses to commit capacity resources, it gives up the price
di®erential between the foreign and national energy markets. Hence, the opportunity cost
is increasing in (f ¡ P) and indeed, if there is no spread between the internal energy
market price and the external one, or the system is isolate, so export are impossible, the
opportunity costs of committing the full capacity requirement falls to zero.
5 Perfect Competition
Consider now the case of n > 1 price-taking ¯rms. Since both the energy and capacity
markets are perfectly competitive, the energy equilibrium price will be equal to (zero)
marginal costs, and the capacity equilibrium price will be given by the opportunity cost
of committing capacity resources.
Given that pro¯ts in the internal energy market will be zero, ¯rms' revenues can only
come from two sources: exports, which are paid at f, and capacity payments. The value
of exports is constrained by the amount of committed resources that are recalled to satisfy
internal demand. In the event of no recall, ¯rms fully exploit the transmission line, thus
making pro¯ts ¯f: If there is recall, which may occur whenever demand exceeds K ¡ ¯;
total exports are given by the value of total productive capacity net of those resources
committed to satisfy the recall requirement.
Aggregate industry pro¯ts from selling energy are similar to those of the monopolist,








[K ¡ D]fdG(D) +
Z 1
µ
[K ¡ µ]fdG(D) (3)
where µ = maxfK ¡ ¯;µg:
In the capacity market, ¯rms bid at their opportunity costs. Committing any amount
equal or less than K ¡¯ has no opportunity cost, since those resources will in any case be
o®ered internally. Committing more than that, and in particular, committing £; implies a
loss in export revenues, and thus a strictly positive opportunity cost. The pro¯t function
in the capacity market is thus independent of µ for µ 2 [0;K ¡ ¯]; while for higher values
of the capacity commitment, µ 2 [K ¡ ¯;£]; ¯rms earn (3) plus the capacity market
revenues; over this latter range, capacity market pro¯ts are convex in µ.Capacity Markets for Electricity 14
Similarly to the monopoly case, if the price cap is larger than the opportunity cost
of committing the total amount of resources demanded, the capacity market will clear at
that cost. Otherwise, ¯rms will optimally choose to only commit their non-exportable
capacity.
The following Lemma identi¯es the critical value of the opportunity cost Cc that de-
termines the competitive industry's optimal commitment:
Lemma 2 There exists Cc = Cc(£;K¡¯;f) such that the competitive industry's optimal
decision is to o®er to commit at least £ capacity resources if C ¸ Cc (market-clearing
equilibrium) and to only o®er to commit the non-exportable capacity, K ¡ ¯; otherwise
(capacity-de¯cit equilibrium).
Again, the critical value Cc represents the opportunity cost of committing £ rather
than (K ¡ ¯) resources, i.e. the loss in market revenues relative to the gain in capacity




D ¡ (K ¡ ¯)
£ ¡ (K ¡ ¯)
dG(D) + [1 ¡ G(£)]
¸
(4)
A similar interpretation as the one given in the monopoly case can be applied here
to show that increases in £ and (K ¡ ¯) both have a negative impact on Cc; and that if
the neighboring energy market is as pro¯table as the internal one (i.e. f = 0), or trade is
impossible, supplying capacity comes at no cost.
In a perfectly competitive environment, the capacity market clears at Cc that represents
the opportunity cost of listing capacity.16 Hence prices above this value signal market




Cm > Cm (5)
As long as the energy market abroad is more pro¯table that the national one (i.e. under
the assumption (f ¡ P) > 0); the costs of inducing market clearing in the capacity market
16Interestingly, the MMU (2001) a±rms that \for a daily capacity market, a conservative approximation
of the comparative price can be calculated by multiplying the di®erential between the external forward
energy price and the internal forward energy price by the 16 on peak hours, as that is a conservative
estimate of the value of the opportunity foregone by selling capacity in the PJM capacity markets". It
is speci¯ed that the 16 on peak hours are used because the forward price contracts in the energy price
comparison are price over 16 hours.Capacity Markets for Electricity 15
are larger in the competitive case than in the monopoly case. Clearly, the opportunity
costs are larger in the former: giving up the external price f to earn a price equal to
marginal costs if recalled is more costly than giving it up in exchange of earning P in the
event of recall. Said di®erently, capacity requirements transfer funds to generators via a
capacity markets, and so, when these markets exists, they reduce the size and pro¯tability
of price spikes (Stoft, 2002).
6 The Regulator's Problem
In this section we solve the regulator's problem, under the assumption that he has complete
information concerning the value of ¯rms' opportunity costs. The regulator's decision is
two-fold. First, he has to decide whether to introduce a capacity market or not. And
second, in the case in which the regulator has introduced a capacity market, he has to
choose how many resources to demand in the capacity-market, £; and has to set the
capacity price-cap, C. It is assumed that the regulator aims at maximizing total surplus,
de¯ned as the sum of consumer surplus (from A4; every unit consumed reports a gross
utility equal to v; with v > f > P) plus a share of suppliers' pro¯ts, weighted by the
parameter ® 2 [0;1].
The following Lemmas identify the conditions under which introducing a capacity
market is preferred over power curtailments as a source of reserves. The Lemmas also
characterize the optimal reserve requirement and price-caps, both under monopoly as
under perfect competition.
Lemma 3 Under Monopoly,
(i) There exists vm = vm (®;f;P;K ¡ ¯) such that the regulator ¯nds it optimal to
introduce a capacity market if and only if v > vm:
(ii) If v > vm; the regulator's optimal choice of the capacity requirement equals peak
demand, £¤
m = 1; and his optimal choice of capacity price-cap equals the minimum value
at the which the capacity market clears, C¤
m = Cm(1;K ¡ ¯;f ¡ P).
The previous Lemma shows that v needs to be large enough in order to make it optimal
to introduce a capacity market. Otherwise, the costs of inducing the monopolist to commit
as many resources so as to cover the reserve margin would be too large with respect to
the gains of avoiding shortages.Capacity Markets for Electricity 16
The parameter v can also be interpreted as the price that consumers would be willing
to receive to be subject to power curtailment: this creates reserves coming out from the
amount of load that consumers have agreed to reduce when called upon by the system.
Given that a unit of electricity not requested by a customer has the same e®ect as an
additional unit of electricity being generated (FERC, 2001), only for large values of v it
is optimal to create a capacity market rather than to resort to voluntary curtailment as a
source of reserves.
Interestingly enough, the larger the price-cap, the lower will be the critical value of
v above which having a capacity market is optimal. The reason is that a higher P leads
to lower opportunity costs of committing capacity resources, and hence to lower capacity
payments. In other words, having a capacity market in a `price-spike world' is cheap, and
it may even turn out to be unnecessary when the price cap P is so large that it exceeds the
foreign price f (see Lemma 5 below). Similarly, the smaller the transmission capacity and
the lower the prevailing foreign energy price, the lower are the monopolist's opportunity
costs, and hence, the lower is the critical v needed to make the capacity market optimal.
If the regulator has decided to introduce a capacity market, his optimal decision would
be to set the capacity requirement at a level that guarantees no shortages, i.e. to set it
equal to peak demand.17 This does not only avoid the losses from power curtailment, but
it also reduces total capacity payments to the monopolist.
Similar results can be derived for the competitive scenario.
Lemma 4 Under Perfect Competition,
(i) There exists vc = vc (®;f;K ¡ ¯) such that the regulator ¯nds it optimal to intro-
duce a capacity market if and only if v > vc:
(ii) For all v > vc; the regulator's optimal choice of the capacity requirement equals
peak demand, £¤
c = 1; and his optimal choice of capacity price-cap equals the minimum
value at the which the capacity market clears, C¤
c = Cc(1;K ¡ ¯;f).
The comparison of vm and vc shows that having a capacity market may be optimal
under monopoly and suboptimal under perfect competition, i.e. vc ¸ vm: This is so
since the capacity payments needed to induce market clearing under perfect competition
17Recall that we are assuming away the probability of capacity or transmission outages. Introducing it
would be straightforward, and would imply that the optimal reserve margin is equal to peak demand plus
the expected outage rate.Capacity Markets for Electricity 17
exceed those under monopoly, since by equation (5), Cc > Cm. The di®erence between
the capacity prices is not enough to compensate for the extra gains achieved under perfect
competition (when recalled, the competitive ¯rms are paid at marginal costs rather than
at the price-cap).18 But if ¯rms' pro¯ts are fully taken into account by the regulator
(® = 1); the di®erence between the two threshold values vm and vc vanishes.
Nevertheless, even if capacity payments are larger under perfect competition, the social
cost of monopoly resulting from larger energy prices is not o®set. This implies that it is
preferable to have a stringent pricing policy and an active competition policy in the energy
market (i.e. low P and a larger number of ¯rms) even it implies increasing capacity
payments up to the point at which having a capacity market may no longer be optimal.19
To conclude this section, we have analyzed the optimality of resorting to an alternative
sources of reserves. Namely, the possibility that the regulator `imports the foreign price
spike', i.e. raises the national energy market price cap P up to f; in order to avoid exports,
induce imports and thereby eliminate the need to introduce a capacity market, as in this
case the opportunity costs of committing more than the non-exportable capacity is zero.20
Lemma 5 In the monopoly case, independently of v; it is not optimal to import the foreign
price spike, i.e. to set P = f; in order to avoid the need of a capacity market.
The reason for the above result is that the foreign market price a®ects the capacity
payment only partially, whereas importing it by setting P = f implies that it will be paid
at all times. Thus, creating reserves through a capacity market is preferable to avoiding
exports through increased market prices.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a simple model aimed at capturing some of the main features of
electricity capacity markets. We have used it to characterize ¯rms' optimal behavior and
equilibrium outcomes, as well as to address some of the regulatory issues involved in the
design of these markets.
18See Corollary 1 and its proof in the appendix.
19See Corollary 2 and its proof in the appendix.
20This alternative is inconsequential under perfect competition, given that the price-cap is never binding.Capacity Markets for Electricity 18
First, we have identi¯ed the factors that determine the opportunity costs of committing
capacity resources. When a generator commits a fraction of its capacity resources, he
faces a trade-o®: committing more capacity resources implies larger revenues through the
capacity market, but it also implies that, in the event of recall, such a generator will have
to give up the revenue from alternatives sales, i.e. the price di®erential between the foreign
and national energy prices. Therefore, the relatively more pro¯table the foreign energy
market, the higher the opportunity costs of committing capacity resources, and the larger
the capacity payments required to induce full commitment. This observation is consistent
with the evidence that, during the summer of 2000, the PJM capacity markets experienced
price spikes at the same time as energy prices fairly low (Section 2). Furthermore, our
model shows that the opportunity costs of committing capacity are also a function of the
probability of recall, the amount of the resources required to ensure system reliability,
the transmission capacity, and the intensity of price competition in the energy market.
Decreasing spot market prices through more intense competition (or lower price caps)
may come at the cost of increasing capacity payments.
Overall, our model suggests that capacity markets can clear at zero prices (as in PJM
during April 2001) if there is no spread between national and foreign energy prices, but
also if the capacity obligations can be satis¯ed with the resources that, due to transmission
constraints, cannot be exported, or if the system has excess capacity and the probability
of recall falls to zero.
We have also analyzed ¯rms' optimal behavior in the capacity market, and thus equi-
librium outcomes. Depending on the value of the capacity price-cap and the reserve
requirement set by the regulator, two types of equilibria may arise. First, the capacity-
de¯cit equilibrium, in which generators only commit the fraction of their capacities that
has no opportunity costs but the required resources exceed the supply. And second, the
market-clearing equilibrium, in which generators jointly o®er to commit enough capacity
resources so as to cover the capacity requirement (and in fact eliminate the probability of
shortages). Whether the ¯rst or the second type of equilibria arise mainly depends on the
capacity price-cap: if it is too low, generators' opportunity costs would not be covered,
and a capacity de¯cit would arise, as it has been the case, for instance, in PJM during
the summer of 2000. Thus, even in the presence of capacity markets, the system would be
short of resources, leaving unsolved the reliability problem.
Last, we have assessed the desirability of introducing capacity markets, and charac-Capacity Markets for Electricity 19
terized the optimal reserve requirement and price-cap in these markets. We have found
that a capacity market does not necessarily maximize social welfare. The costs of ensuring
full reliability may exceed the gains from avoiding power curtailments, precisely when the
generators' opportunity costs from committing capacity resources are extremely large. In-
ducing optimal commitment is more costly the larger the transmission capacity, the higher
the external prices, and, most importantly, the lower the energy price. Since a monopo-
list will set the energy price at the price-cap, the costs of inducing optimal commitment
are larger the more competitive the industry, the condition for capacity markets to be
desirable is more stringent under the most competitive scenario. That is, depending on
consumers' valuation (alternatively, on the price that consumers are willing to receive in
exchange of voluntary curtailment of power), it might be optimal to introduce a capacity
market in a monopolized industry, but suboptimal in a su±ciently competitive one.
Conditionally on having a capacity market, the model shows that it is always optimal to
fully avoid the risk of shortage by setting the capacity requirement equal to peak demand
(plus expected outages) and to set the capacity price cap equal to ¯rms' opportunity costs
of providing full capacity commitment (though these can be very large). Any departure
from this level, either undermines the functioning of these markets, or leaves scope for the
exercise of market power (as in the PJM capacity market during the ¯rst quarter of 2001).
Noteworthy, we have shown that the optimality of introducing capacity markets is
una®ected by the existence of tradable transmission rights. This is true even though
the additional rents achieved by trading these rights contribute to reduce ¯rms' opportu-
nity costs of committing capacity resources, and thus capacity payments. Therefore, the
functioning and optimal design of capacity markets not only depend on the amount of
tradable transmission rights, but also on the transmission market and its microstructure
(see Joskow and Tirole 2000 and 2003).
Last, we would like to stress that an important role of capacity markets is to provide
incentives for the construction of new generation. Whereas it is sometimes expected
that the energy market will provide such incentives, the advocates of capacity markets
argue that, if capacity decisions are let to the market alone, the capacity needed for
reserve purposes will be built only after periods of intense price volatility, price spikes and
shortages. An analysis of this issue is out of the scope of the paper.Capacity Markets for Electricity 20
Appendix A: Proofs
Monopoly
Proof of Lemma 1:
For a given capacity commitment µ; the monopolist's total pro¯ts are equal to Cµ +
¼m (µ); where ¼m (µ) is given in (1). Taking the ¯rst and second derivatives of the mo-
nopolist's total pro¯t with respect to µ;






C if µ · K ¡ ¯
C ¡ [f ¡ P][1 ¡ G(µ)] if µ > K ¡ ¯





0 if µ · K ¡ ¯
[f ¡ P]g (µ) if µ > K ¡ ¯
Given that
@[¼m(µ)+Cµ]
@µ > 0 for µ · K ¡ ¯; then o®ering to commit any amount lower
than K¡¯ is dominated by o®ering to commit K¡¯: Given
@2[¼m(µ)+Cµ]
@µ2 > 0 for µ > K¡¯;
the monopolist will optimally o®er to commit either K¡¯ or at least £ capacity resources.
He will choose to commit £ if and only if:
C£ + ¼m (£) ¸ C [K ¡ ¯] + ¼m (K ¡ ¯)
Rearranging terms,
C ¸ Cm =
¼ (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼ (£)
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
And using (1), simple algebra leads to,




D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸
dG(D) + [1 ¡ G(£)]
¸









[D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]]dG(D) < 0
@Cm
@ (K ¡ ¯)
= ¡
f ¡ P




[£ ¡ D]dG(D) < 0
@Cm





D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸
dG(D) + [1 ¡ G(£)] > 0Capacity Markets for Electricity 21
Perfect Competition
Proof of Lemma 2:
The ¯rst part of the proof is similar to that of the monopolist (the single di®erence is
that all the terms multiplied by P in the monopolist's pro¯t expressions, disappear under
perfect competition). Hence, we move directly to the characterization of the opportunity
costs of committing £ rather than K ¡¯: The competitive industry will choose to commit
£ if and only if
c£ + ¼c (£) ¸ c[K ¡ ¯] + ¼c (K ¡ ¯)
where c is the equilibrium price in the capacity market. Rearranging terms,
c ¸ Cc =
¼c (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼c (£)
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
Given perfect competition, the equilibrium price will equal Cc as long as this price is below





D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸
dG(D) + [1 ¡ G(£)]
¸
Last, given that Cc =
f
f¡P Cm the comparative statics of Cc with respect to £ and K ¡¯;
and f are the same as in the monopoly case.
The Regulator's Problem
Proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4:
The regulator has to decide whether to create or not a capacity market; in the case in
which he has decided to create a capacity market, he has to set a capacity requirement and
a capacity market-price cap. We will analyze these two decisions by backward induction
¯rst for the monopoly case, and second for the case of perfect competition. Throughout,
its is assumed that the regulator aims at maximizing the sum of consumer surplus (every
unit consumed reports an utility equal to v > f > P) plus an ® 2 [0;1] share of producers'
surplus.
Monopoly:
Assume that the regulator has created a capacity market. Clearly, we can ignore two
cases: ¯rst, £ · K ¡ ¯ - paying for capacity resources that the monopolist would in
any case o®er in the energy market would increase costs without decreasing shortages;Capacity Markets for Electricity 22
and second C < Cm - by Lemma 1, the monopolist would just o®er its non-exportable
capacity, that he would use to produce internally even without a capacity market. Hence,
we focus on parameter values £ 2 (K ¡ ¯;1] and C ¸ Cm: Total welfare is given by
WC
m (£;C) = [v ¡ P]
·Z £
0






[DP + ¯f]dG(D) +
Z £
K¡¯





[P£ + [K ¡ £]f]dG(D) + C£
¸
which can be re-written as,
WC
m (£;C) = [v ¡ [1 ¡ ®]P]
·Z £
0




¯G(K ¡ ¯) +
Z £
K¡¯




m (£;C) is decreasing in C. Hence, the regulator will set C equal to the
minimum level that induces the monopolist to commit the desired £; i.e. C = Cm:
The ¯rst derivative of WC




= [v ¡ f][1 ¡ G(£)]
+[1 ¡ ®][f ¡ P]
[K ¡ ¯]




D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸
dG(D) > 0
It is therefore optimal to set the reserve requirement equal to peak-demand, £¤
m = 1.
The resulting level of welfare is given by
WC













¡[1 ¡ ®][f ¡ P]
Z 1
K¡¯
D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
dG(D)
Let us now analyze the regulator's decision of whether or not to introduce a capacity
market. In the absence of a capacity market, only the non-exportable capacity K ¡ ¯ is
o®ered. Total welfare is given by
WNC
m = [v ¡ P]
·Z K¡¯
0





[DP + ¯f]dG(D) + [P [K ¡ ¯] + ¯f][1 ¡ G(K ¡ ¯)]
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which can also be rewritten as
WNC
m = [v ¡ [1 ¡ ®]P]
·Z K¡¯
0
DdG(D) + [K ¡ ¯][1 ¡ G(K ¡ ¯)]
¸
+ ®¯f (7)
Thus, for the regulator to optimally choose to implement a capacity market, we require





[v ¡ P] ¡ [f ¡ P]
1 ¡ ®[K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸Z 1
K¡¯
[D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]]dG(D)
which depends on the sign of the ¯rst element on the RHS Straightforward calculations
show that this element is positive if and only if
v > vm (®;f;P;K ¡ ¯) = [f ¡ P]
1 ¡ ®[K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
+ P




[1 ¡ ®][K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
< 0
@vm
@ [K ¡ ¯]
=
[f ¡ P][1 ¡ ®]
[1 ¡ (K ¡ ¯)]
2 > 0
Perfect Competition:
We use a similar reasoning as above; recall that the price in the energy market is now
equal to (zero) marginal production costs.
Assume that the regulator has created a capacity market and focus on parameter values
£ 2 (K ¡ ¯;1] and C ¸ Cc: Total welfare is given by
WC
c (£;C) = v
·Z £
0




¯G(K ¡ ¯) +
Z £
K¡¯




c (£;C) is decreasing in C. Hence, the regulator will set C equal to the
minimum level that induces the monopolist to commit the desired £; i.e. C = Cc:
The ¯rst derivative of WC




= [v ¡ f][1 ¡ G(£)] > 0Capacity Markets for Electricity 24
It is therefore optimal to set the reserve requirement equal to peak-demand, £¤
c = 1. The
resulting level of welfare is given by
WC














D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
dG(D)





DdG(D) + [K ¡ ¯][1 ¡ G(K ¡ ¯)]
¸
+ ®¯f (9)
Thus, for the regulator to optimally choose to introduce a capacity market, we require
that (8) exceeds (9). Taking the di®erence between the two gives
WC




1 ¡ ®[K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸·Z 1
K¡¯
[D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]]dG(D)
¸
which depends on the sign of the ¯rst element on the RHS Straightforward calculations
show that this element is positive if and only if
v > vc (®;f;K ¡ ¯) = f
1 ¡ ®[K ¡ ¯]
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
The sign of the derivatives of vc with respect to ®, f and (K ¡ ¯) is straightforward
and does not contradict comparative statics results found for the monopoly case.
Corollary 1 vc ¸ vm:
Proof of Corollary 1:
The comparison with the critical v value in the monopoly case yields,
vc ¡ vm = P [1 ¡ ®]
K ¡ ¯
1 ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¸ 0
Corollary 2 Given the regulator's optimal decisions, the total level of welfare is always
larger under perfect competition as compared to monopoly, regardless of the level of optimal
capacity payments, and regardless of whether having a capacity market is optimal or not.Capacity Markets for Electricity 25
Proof of Corollary 2:
When having a capacity market is optimal in both the monopoly and the perfect
competition cases, i.e. v ¸ vc:
WC
m ¡ WC











which is clearly negative.
When having a capacity market is optimal under monopoly but not under perfect








When having a capacity market is not optimal neither under monopoly nor under
perfect competition, i.e. v < vm; we have WNC
c > WNC
m since consumer surplus is
trivially larger under perfect competition:
Proof of Lemma 5:
If the regulator sets P = f he would guarantee that the monopolist does not export his
energy, since he is indi®erent between selling it in the foreign or in the national market.





P=f = [v ¡ f]
Z 1
0
DdG(D) + ®Kf (10)
Assume v > vm: For the regulator to optimally choose to implement a capacity market
























[D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]]dG(D)
Which is always positive and independent of v. That is, it is preferable to have a
capacity market, rather than to import the price spike, no matter how small f is.
Assume v · vm. Thus, for the regulator to optimally choose not to implement a
capacity market and set P < f rather than to import the foreign price spike, we require








P=f for every value of v; and
WC
m (1;Cm (1)) < WNC
m
¯ ¯
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That is, it is preferable not to have a capacity market, rather than importing the price
spike, no matter how small f is.
Appendix B: Tradable Transmission Rights
In this appendix, we relax the assumption that transmission rights are non-tradable.
Monopoly
Assume that the monopolist owns the transmission rights and that he has the choice of
renting the line to the regulator (or the System Operator). The monopolist will set an
access charge equal to the regulator's maximum willingness to pay, v ¡ f. We have to
assume P < v ¡ f < f; since otherwise the regulator would prefer to import energy
rather than to buy it from the monopolist, and the monopolist would prefer to rent the
transmission line rather than to produce energy himself.
The monopolist chooses his capacity commitment µ 2 [0;£] to maximize expected
pro¯ts ¼t






¼m (µ) if µ · K ¡ ¯
¼m (µ) + [v ¡ f]
R 1
µ [D ¡ µ]dG(D) if µ > K ¡ ¯











C if µ · K ¡ ¯









0 if µ · K ¡ ¯
[v ¡ f]g (µ) if µ > K ¡ ¯
With tradable transmission rights, the monopolist's opportunity costs decrease with re-
spect to the base case (by the amount [v ¡ f][1 ¡ G(µ)]; that is the access rate times
the probability of recall). Hence, capacity payments guaranteeing the market clearing
equilibrium will also decrease, given the rental revenues, as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 6 There exists Ct
m = Ct (£;v ¡ f;K ¡ ¯) · Cm such that the monopolist's op-
timal commitment decision when he can rent the transmission line is to commit all his
resources if C ¸ Ct
m and to only commit his non-exportable capacity otherwise; where
Ct
m = Cm ¡
v ¡ f
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
Z 1
£
[D ¡ £]dG(D)Capacity Markets for Electricity 27
Proof of Lemma 6:
The monopolist's optimal commitment decision is given by £ if the following condition
is satis¯ed, and K ¡ ¯ otherwise.
C£ + ¼t
m (£) ¸ C [K ¡ ¯] + ¼t




m (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼t
m (£)
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
=
¼m (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼m (£)
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¡
v ¡ f






£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
Z 1
£
[D ¡ £]dG(D) = Ct
m · Cm
as D ¡ £ ¸ 0 for D 2 [£;1]:
All the comparative statics are ambiguous, as to the e®ects that we know on Cm; some




£ [D ¡ £]dG(D) appear.
We now analyze the regulator's problem. With respect to the monopoly case, the
welfare function is augmented by the term ®[v ¡ f]
R 1
£ [D ¡ £]dG(D) which decreases
with £: Hence, when one increases the capacity requirement, the monopolist makes lower
rents since the regulator will rent the line less often. Nevertheless, this negative e®ect of
the capacity requirement is weighted by ® and therefore counterbalanced by the positive
e®ect of £ on the other terms of the welfare function. We conclude that:
Lemma 7 The regulator's optimal decisions are una®ected by the possibility of renting
the line.
Proof of Lemma: 7:
When the monopolist has committed µ capacity resources and the regulator has set
a price cap equal to C and accepted the monopolist's take-it-of-leave it o®er to rent his
excess transmission capacity at a unit price v ¡ f; the welfare function is
WCt
m (£;C) = [v ¡ P]
·Z £
0






[DP + ¯f]dG(D) +
Z £
K¡¯





[P£ + [K ¡ £]f]dG(D) + C£
¸
+ ®[v ¡ f]
Z 1
£
[D ¡ £]dG(D)Capacity Markets for Electricity 28
Given that WCt
m (£;C) is decreasing in C, the regulator will set C equal to the mini-
mum level that induces the monopolist to commit the desired £: Taking the ¯rst derivative
of WCt




= [1 ¡ ®]
·
[v ¡ f][1 ¡ G(£)] + [f ¡ P]
K ¡ ¯
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
Z £
K¡¯
D ¡ [K ¡ ¯]




Therefore, conditional on deciding to implement a capacity market, it is still optimal to
set £ = 1: Given that Ct
m (1) = Cm (1); the regulator is indi®erent between renting the
line or not (i.e. the level of welfare and capacity payments are the same as in the case in
which renting the line was not possible).
Last, since total welfare is equal when £¤ = 1, then it must be that v ¸ vm:
Perfect Competition
If both the energy and the transmission rights market are competitive, the value of one
unit of transmission rights is equal to the nodal price, i.e. the di®erence between foreign
price and national prices: ´ = f ¡0: Given that we have assumed v > f; this implies that
all the rights will be sold at f:
Competitive ¯rms choose their capacity commitment µ 2 [0;£] to maximize expected
pro¯ts ¼t






¼c (µ) if µ · K ¡ ¯
¼c (µ) + f
R 1
µ [D ¡ µ]dG(D) if µ > K ¡ ¯
and c is the capacity market price. Taking the ¯rst and second derivatives of the compet-











c if µ · K ¡ ¯









0 if µ · K ¡ ¯
2fg (µ) if µ > K ¡ ¯
Similarly to the monopoly case, with tradable transmission rights, ¯rms' opportunity
costs and the capacity payments guaranteeing the market clearing equilibrium decrease
with respect to the no-right case, whereas regulatory decisions remain unchanged:Capacity Markets for Electricity 29
Lemma 8 There exists Ct
c = Ct (£;v ¡ f;K ¡ ¯) < Cc such that the competitive ¯rms
will rent their spare transmission capacity at f; and will commit all available capacity
resources if C ¸ Ct
c; and only the non-exportable capacity otherwise, where
Ct
c = Cc ¡
f




The regulator's decisions are una®ected by the possibility of renting the line.
Proof of Lemma 8:
The competitive ¯rms' optimal commitment decision is given by £ if the following
condition is satis¯ed, and K ¡ ¯ otherwise.
c£ + ¼t
c (£) ¸ c[K ¡ ¯] + ¼t





c (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼t
c (£)
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
=
¼c (K ¡ ¯) ¡ ¼c (£)
£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
¡
f






£ ¡ [K ¡ ¯]
Z 1
£
[D ¡ £]dG(D) · Cc
Comparative statics are ambiguous.
Since the transmission rights imply a pure rent transfer from consumers to ¯rms with
respect to the basic model, the welfare function can be rewritten as:
WCt
c (£;C) = WC








= (v ¡ f)[1 ¡ G(£)] + f(1 ¡ ®)[1 ¡ G(£)] > 0
which implies £¤ = 1 and Ct
c (1) = Cc (1):
Last, since when setting £¤ = 1 welfare is equal to the no-right case, then having a
capacity market is optimal under the same condition as before, i.e. v ¸ vc:Capacity Markets for Electricity 30
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